{∅, {∅}, {∅, {∅}}} : Rage Against the Meat Grinder

The following article is a good reference for several threads.  I am placing it here first, since "the natural attitude" toward life reeks of Merleau-Ponty's (and Husserl's) thought, and particularly, because of the inclusion of "phenomenological psychiatry" ---- There are several threads which really belong to "Madness Theory," so, like I said, if this turns out to have something of great relavance there, I will link to this post from there.

Philosophy and Madness. Radical Turns in the Natural Attitude to Life by Wouter Kusters

 Abstract:
In this article, the relation between philosophy and madness is examined from both the perspective of phenomenological philosophy and psychiatry, and the narratives of those with a diagnosis of psychosis. Three theses are proposed:

1) a (phenomenological) philosophical attitude toward psychotic experience yields more insightful, substantial descriptions of madness, 2) serious and consistent philosophical reasoning shows remarkable affinities and similarities with patterns in psychotic experience, and 3) from madness proto-philosophical thought springs forward. In following the lines of intense mad ‘hyper-reflexivity’ and perplexity we may discover a rich world of para-philosophy, one that corresponds with philosophical ideas driven by a less strained reflexivity and wonder. By examining the relation between philosophy and madness, both parties may profit: psychotic experience may be further clarified and brought into easier relation with non-psychotic thought and practice, and philosophy may gain by widening its range of perspectives on reality and human subjectivity.

In this article,  I examine the relation between philosophy and madness. It is often assumed that madness has to be suppressed, excluded, or conquered before a philosophically sensible text, logical argument, or world of meaning can appear. I argue, instead, that a certain concept of madness, when grafted on phenomenological psychiatry and philosophical mysticism, is intrin-sically related to the project of philosophy. With the help of experiences of madness as presented in psychiatry and articulated in mad autobiographi-cal reports, including my own, I will show that philosophy and madness are in closer connection than is commonly assumed.

In the introduction, I refer to some superficial similarities between the two domains, and I define the domain of investigation. Next, I discuss the way these two relate to each other. What is the contribution of philosophy for an investigation into madness? To what extent is madness an effect or result of philosophy? What kind of philosophical dispositions emerge from madness? In the last section, I draw some conclusions.


A Relationship in Oblivion

The discussions in the backrooms of academic philosophy correspond, with respect to their monologous form and content, and especially their world strangeness and detachment of daily practice, with quite a few dialogues and monologues in the smoking rooms of the psychiatric ward. Instead of interpreting this observation as a pejorative for philosophy, I argue that this is an heuristically interesting and inspiring similarity.

 Although this similarity does not come as a surprise for the novice, the philosopher seldom considers it seriously. Wittgenstein (1969, par. 467) remarks:

I am sitting with a philosopher in the garden; he says again and again ‘I know that that’s a tree’, pointing to a tree that is near us. Someone else arrives and hears this, and I tell him:

‘This fellow isn’t insane. We are only doing philosophy.’